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In the last few years we have witnessed a remarkable change in social and 
political attitudes about marriage. After decades of campaigning, the cause 
for same-sex marriage has scored a string of success. Today, same-sex mar-
riage is legally performed and recognized (nationwide or in some parts) in 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Though not 
legal per se in Armenia, Estonia, and Israel, same-sex marriage performed 
abroad is legally recognized in these countries.
At the same time, the institution of marriage has come under intense 
scrutiny from political philosophers working within a broad liberal tradi-
tion. These philosophers agree with the advocates of same-sex marriage 
that it is unjust to make marriage available to opposite-sex couples while 
excluding same-sex couples. But some of these philosophers give only their 
heavily-qualifi ed support to the same-sex marriage campaigners’ funda-
mental goal—which is to give same-sex couples access to something that 
closely approximates the current institution of marriage. According to 
these political philosophers, marriage, in its current form, is incompatible 
with liberal principles of justice. Thus, on their view, marriage should ide-
ally be either radically reformed or completely abolished. With her Against 
Marriage, Clare Chambers leads the latter group and provides an extreme-
ly rich, lucid, and timely argument against state-recognized marriage.
Chambers opens her book with the claim that it is “for everyone, re-
gardless of marital status” (1). Indeed, one of the book’s strengths is that 
the arguments presented can be appealing to all fi ve groups she lists at 
the outset: “the happily married,” “the happily unmarried,” the “unhap-
pily unmarried,” “the unhappily married,” and “children, whose social 
wellbeing should not depend on their parents’ marital status” (1). But, as 
Chambers also warns, “this book is not for everyone regardless of political 
conviction” (1). Her argument is driven by a commitment to egalitarianism 
arising from the feminist belief that “society is deeply gendered, in a way 
that harms women, and [that] this is wrong” (2). So, social conservatives 
or religious fundamentalists who wish to retain a particularly sexist and 
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heterosexist organization of intimacy are likely to be, at best, untouched by 
the arguments of the book. Nonetheless, anyone with some egalitarian com-
mitments will fi nd plenty of interesting material to dwell on.
The book has two parts, each with three chapters. Part I, entitled Against 
Marriage, defends the negative thesis: state recognition of marriage in any 
form should be abolished. Canvassing a broad range of philosophical litera-
ture on marriage, Chambers argues that state-regulated marriage, both as 
it currently exists and even when radically transformed, violates core prin-
ciples of liberalism: those of equality and liberty.
Chapter 1 argues that marriage violates liberalism’s commitment to 
equality by, at best, ignoring and, at worst, perpetuating the sexist and het-
erosexist foundations of marriage. Marriage is sexist both symbolically and 
materially. The marriage ceremony wrongs women symbolically when they 
are expected to wear a white dress to symbolize their virginity and purity, 
when the father “gives away” his daughter to her husband, and when the 
minister (or priest) tells the new husband that he can kiss his bride as if she 
no longer has to consent to such things. Materially, marriage is problematic 
because of an all-too-common unequal division of labor within marriages, 
the diffi culty for women to remove themselves from abusive marriages, and 
the continued fi nancial imbalance between men and women which is usu-
ally exacerbated in divorce settlements. Moreover, marriage is heterosexist 
because, in most jurisdictions still, it only permits marriage between one 
man and one woman. Chambers also argues here that civil unions (or other 
reformed versions of marriage) “maintain inequality between partnered 
and unpartnered people” of all sexualities (42).
State-recognized marriage also violates liberty, Chambers argues in 
Chapter 2, by promoting a particular conception of the good without suf-
fi ciently weighty public reasons for doing so. It does so in part because it 
offers advantages to married couples not available to unmarried couples, 
such as tax breaks, pension/insurance benefi ts, visitation rights, and im-
migration status. Hence, people might choose marriage not because they 
really want to, but in order to achieve benefi ts that would not be available 
to them otherwise. This violates the liberal principle that the state ought to 
remain neutral between different conceptions of the good life.
In Chapter 3, Chambers considers several liberal justifi cations for 
state-recognized marriage including arguments based on the idea (i) that 
marriage helps to convey social meaning and thus enables better commu-
nication, (ii) that marriage can promote gender equality, (iii) that marriage 
fosters care, (iv) that marriage promotes social stability, and (v) that mar-
riage is necessary for child protection. In each case, Chambers contends, the 
arguments fail to show that state-recognized marriage is both a necessary 
and an acceptable means of achieving the public good in question.
Part II of the book, The Marriage-Free State, sets out the positive thesis: 
since in an ideally just state there is no state-recognized marriage, personal 
relationships still need to be regulated “so as to protect vulnerable par-
ties, including but not only children; so as to regulate disputes over such 
matters as joint property; so as to establish the rights and duties of third 
parties; and so as to appropriately direct state benefi ts and taxes” (115). 
Personal relationships should be regulated, Chambers holds, in a piecemeal 
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way based on the practices people engage in. This form of regulation dis-
tinguishes Chambers from others who argued for the abolition of marriage.
In Chapter 4, Chambers considers and rejects relationship contracts as 
a replacement for state-recognized marriage. Though relationship contracts 
give signifi cant freedom for people to regulate their relationships in a way 
that best fi ts their individual needs, they too can undermine both liberty 
and equality. The parties to the contract, particularly women, may not be 
free and equal at the moment of making the contract, or they might end up 
unfree and unequal by agreeing to certain terms, or both. Moreover, rela-
tionships contracts can prove to be diffi cult and even undesirable to enforce: 
after all, if relationship contracts are to be legally enforceable, the state 
is invited to intervene on any matter on which the parties have chosen to 
contract. This would be giving far too much power to the state with respect 
to our private lives.
In Chapter 5, hence, Chambers makes her own original contribution 
regarding the question how personal relationships should be regulated 
in a marriage-free state. She argues that intimate relationships between 
citizens should be regulated (1) in a piecemeal rather than holistic fashion; 
(2) with a focus on relationship practices rather than status; and (3) with 
the freedom to opt out of default regulations rather than to opt in. Such a 
regulation would mean that there would not be any particular “relationship 
status,” such as traditional marriage, Tamara Metz’s Intimate Care-Giving 
Union, or Elizabeth Brake’s Minimal Marriage, that would provide a pre-
determined set of rights and benefi ts. Instead, regulations about care, co-
habitation, economic and emotional interdependence, and parenting would 
exist independently from one another. This avoids the assumption that all 
the goods of being in a relationship are to be achieved in one relationship. 
The emphasis on relationship practices rather than on relationship status 
as well as the requirement to opt out instead of to opt in are meant to re-
strict anyone from passing on any value-judgment and to protect those who, 
for whatever reason, lack the relevant status.
While arguing against state-recognized marriage, Chambers acknowl-
edges the importance of religious and secular marriage ceremonies and 
practices to some (perhaps many) citizens, both straight and gay. Rather 
than critiquing or devaluing the desire to be married (as some marriage 
critics do), she accepts this desire as legitimate and seeks to accommodate 
it. Thus, in Chapter 6, Chambers distinguishes the marriage-free state from 
the marriage-free society and considers the circumstances under which the 
state might be justifi ed in intervening in private marriages. Here Chambers 
clearly distinguishes her own position from a libertarian one by focusing on 
the state’s role in preventing harm to vulnerable parties (such as women 
and children) and on ensuring that objectionable discriminatory practices 
are prohibited in the private sector too. Chambers skillfully argues, for ex-
ample, that religious exemptions from anti-discrimination legislation can-
not be upheld by reference to freedom of association. When women are ex-
cluded from priesthood and lesbian and gay Catholics are excluded from 
the rites of marriage, their freedom of association is hindered: they become 
outsiders, “people who must be excluded for the comfort and bonds of oth-
ers” (180). However, unlike private clubs, where adults who join them are 
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aware of the group’s commitments, Chambers reminds us, religions are “a 
lot more like states and other public institutions” (183). They have, in other 
words, a profound effect on people’s lives from birth: some women, gays, 
and lesbians have been members of their religious communities from child-
hood. Thus, they are insiders to a community that actively and unjustly 
harms them by excluding them on the basis of belonging to a certain group 
(women, gay, and lesbian) for which they had no choice. Similarly, religious 
law governing marriage (and divorce), such as Jewish religious law that 
is still upheld by Conservative and Orthodox Jews, must not allow some 
members to live under a religious authority that harms them without their 
consent. “The state must do whatever it can,” Chambers argues, “to ensure 
that women and other vulnerable people are not trapped in oppressive re-
ligious marriages” (199). Religious freedom, Chambers concludes, cannot 
include the right of religious leaders to discriminate against members of 
their own religion.
Throughout the book, Chambers displays an impressive familiarity with 
both feminist and non-feminist scholars of marriage and the family, both 
critics and advocates of marriage, representatives of a variety of liberal the-
oretical approaches, as well as with religion and culture. Chambers is also 
masterful at anticipating and responding carefully to potential objections 
to her arguments and proposals. Moreover, as a philosopher, Chambers is 
thoughtful, precise, and meticulous; as a feminist, she is concerned, com-
passionate, and attentive to the complexity and diversity of people’s lives. 
Nonetheless, there are certain worries about some of her key points.
While there is much to agree with in Chambers’ critique of the institu-
tion of marriage, there is at least one important concern about her nega-
tive argument. The foci of Chambers’ argument against state-recognized 
marriage is, among others, a concern about the unjustifi ed stigmatization 
(or as she terms it, borrowing from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, “symbolic 
violence”) of single and unmarried people. It is vague, however, what the 
stigmatization consists in. One possibility is that it involves the negative 
beliefs some (perhaps most) members of society have about being single 
or unmarried. If this is so, it is unclear that it is the business of a politi-
cally liberal state to eradicate such beliefs. After all, a neutral, liberal state 
should not be taking sides on disputed questions about what is a good life; 
that is, individuals should have the autonomy to decide for themselves what 
is of value. If the state should not be encouraging marriage in any way, it 
should not be encouraging being single or unmarried either.
Another possibility is that the stigmatization Chambers identifi es in-
volves unjustly discriminating against single or unmarried people, or in 
some other way infringing on their civil and political rights. In this case, 
a politically liberal state should certainly aim to protect them from such 
injustices. Yet, it is unclear that the abolition of marriage is necessary or 
effective to achieve this end. Even without state-recognized marriage, some 
citizens will still be coupled and others will continue to be single; the latter 
might well be stigmatized or discriminated against in a marriage-free state.
Although equally informed by her thoughtfulness and attentiveness, 
Chambers’ central proposal—namely, that personal relationships should be 
regulated through a series of piecemeal regulations governing various rela-
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tionship practices—invites some questions too. I am highly sympathetic to 
her argument against “bundling” different relationship practices: according 
rights and benefi ts to all and only those relationships in which economic, 
affective, domestic, sexual, and reproductive care are intertwined makes a 
vast array of other relationships invisible, leaving those who may be most in 
need of support without state protection. Piecemeal regulation of relation-
ship practices may not, however, be as easy as Chambers suggests. Will this 
approach achieve its desired egalitarian end of securing both liberty and 
equality without intruding on people’s privacy? Chambers suggests that:
The state does not need to know a great range of details about people’s 
private lives so as to determine whether they meet the criteria of being in A 
Relationship. It simply needs to know whether some particular relationship 
practice applies. In some cases this will be a matter of objective fact: are 
the people parents? Or, are they both names on the deeds of a property? Or, 
does one have caring responsibilities for the other? (155)
Liberal states, Chambers rightly notes, typically have procedures in 
place to determine the answers to these questions; however, these proce-
dures may not always be so determinate or just.
Imagine a now lesbian woman, happily partnered but unmarried, with 
children from her ex-husband, taking care of children from her new part-
ner, and living in an extended family. Who are the parents to whom in 
this scenario? Who has caring responsibilities? With the advancement of 
medical technology even biological parenthood is now in question. Imagine 
two women seeking IVF treatment at the same hospital. Only one of them 
becomes pregnant as a result of the IVF treatment, and at some stage dur-
ing the pregnancy it is revealed that, due to a mistake, the fetus is the other 
woman’s genetic offspring. The fetus is carried to term by the gestational 
mother. Or, thanks to mitochondrial replacement therapy and the existence 
of gestational procreators, a child can have up to four different biological 
procreators—three genetic and one gestational. Again, who are the parents? 
Confl icts in such cases have been settled differently in different jurisdic-
tions; this indicates that when family confi gurations and methods of repro-
duction are complex, decision procedures may fall short of providing de-
fi nitive answers. Even where existing state procedures deliver a defi nitive 
answer, we cannot assume that those procedures or results are thereby just. 
Indeed, the primary argument of Against Marriage is that procedures for 
allocating rights and responsibilities in state-recognized marriage regimes 
are fundamentally unjust both to many who are married and to many who 
are not.
Against Marriage is certainly a wonderful addition to a growing philo-
sophical literature on marriage. A review, unfortunately, cannot possibly 
do justice to all the thought-provoking and rich material found in the book. 
Hence, I shall conclude by saying that, despite some worries, Chambers’ 
arguments against state-recognized marriage are powerful, thorough, and 
timely, as are her critiques of the most infl uential alternatives found both 
in philosophy and legal theory. Chambers’ articulate style, philosophical 
rigor, and respect for her philosophical interlocutors through a fair treat-
ment of their positions make Against Marriage an excellent model of how 
philosophy can be accessible to both professional philosophers and those 
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with no philosophical training. Against Marriage is surely going to compel 
its readers to think deeply whether the institution of marriage is still viable 
and about how the regulation of adult personal relationships may have to 
be altered to meet the demands of justice.
MARKO KONJOVIĆ
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Tim Crane, The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an 
Atheist’s Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2017, xiv + 207 pp.
While not intended as an academic treatise on religion, Tim Crane’s The 
Meaning of Belief is a thoughtful, interesting refl ection on the nature of 
religious belief in contemporary life. The book is clearly and fl uidly written, 
as one would expect from Crane, and its main theme will be refreshing to 
those who are weary of the cliché-ridden debates between the New Atheists 
and their theistic interlocutors. Crane’s central thesis is that many of his 
fellow atheists incorrectly identify religion with a mere set of cosmological 
and moral propositions, falsely leading them to believe that religious people 
will tend to change their minds after exposure to the right philosophical or 
scientifi c arguments. The book is very rich, and it would be impossible to 
name all its virtues without resorting to a laundry list; I recommend the 
title for its expansiveness alone. However, I found Crane’s overall argument 
unconvincing.
Crane asks, “What is religion, and how does it move people?” and accu-
rately responds that a strict, universal defi nition of religion is probably im-
possible (2–4). He endorses Durkheim's claim that religions are best under-
stood by following how they developed historically, and then provides his own 
defi nition of religion: “Religion, as I am using the word, is a systematic and 
practical attempt by human beings to fi nd meaning in the world and their 
place in it, in terms of their relationship to something transcendent” (6). He 
elaborates upon these points in the next two chapters in terms of “the reli-
gious impulse” and the phenomenon of “identifi cation.”
One puzzling aspect of this fi rst chapter is Crane’s insistence upon the 
theoretical and practical value of his own defi nition of religion, despite his 
admission that religion probably does not have an exhaustive or universal 
essence. He seems to vacillate between a hard realism, which (apparently) 
prevents one from calling “socialism, communism, environmentalism, sci-
entism, humanism, secularism, and atheism” religions (“[W]hat would be 
the point of this?” Crane asks (24)) and a softer anti-essentialism which 
allows that there is likely no single essence of religion. Crane recognizes 
that religion is a historically-conditioned category that may not have been 
used as a concept through much of history; in the end, however, he clearly 
settles into a realist mode. I wish he had better explained and justifi ed this 
move. Why is it best to act as if that there is some real phenomenon which 
lies behind the bundle of characteristics (‘systematicity, practicality, mean-
